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NOTES & COMMENTS 
Compelled Commercial Disclosures: 
Zauderer’s Application to Non-Misleading 
Commercial Speech 
ALEXIS MASON* 
In 1980, the Supreme Court held that a prohibition on 
commercial speech is subject to intermediate scrutiny. 
Roughly five years later, in Zauderer, the Court provided guid-
ance on specific instances in which the government 
may compel commercial speech. The Court held that a re-
quirement that goods or services disclose “factual and un-
controversial” information is constitutional so long as 
the requirement is not unduly burdensome, and the require-
ment is “reasonably related to the State’s interest in prevent-
ing deception of consumers.” This holding applied a ra-
tional basis standard of review to compelled commercial 
speech aimed at curing deception of consumers.  
Despite this guidance, since the Zauderer decision, fed-
eral appellate courts have applied the holding inconsist-
ently—some courts have limited Zauderer’s rational basis 
application to compelled commercial speech disclosures 
                                                                                                             
 *  J.D. 2018, University of Miami Law School; Articles and Comments Edi-
tor of the University of Miami Law Review. I would like to thank my advisor, 
Professor Caroline Mala Corbin, for her support, insight, and helpful feedback 
throughout the drafting of this Comment. Thank you to the University of Miami 
Law Review for selecting this Comment for publication. An additional thank you 
to all the members of the law review who provided comments and edits through-
out the review process. Most of all, thank you to my family for your unwavering 
support of my aspirations and endless celebration of my achievements. I am hum-
bled to be on the receiving end of your love.  
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that are “factual and uncontroversial” and cure deception 
of consumers; while other courts have applied it to all com-
pelled commercial speech disclosures that are “factual and 
uncontroversial” regardless of whether the speech cures de-
ception of consumers. This Comment advocates to limit the 
rational basis standard of review to compelled commercial 
speech disclosures that are “factual and uncontrover-
sial” and cure deception of consumers. The alternative, ap-
plying rational basis to large swaths of disclosures, may lead 
to drowning out important information or bolstering ideo-
logical beliefs because there will always be a legitimate gov-
ernment interest to compel, i.e. the consumer “right to 
know.” Commercial speech is protected speech, and the 
First Amendment protects against speech compulsions just 
as it protects against speech prohibitions. Limiting the ap-
plication of Zauderer would ensure that only legitimate and 
beneficial disclosures are compelled, and that First Amend-
ment protections are not abridged. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“WARNING: Drinking beverages with added sugar(s) contributes 
to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay.”1 
 
“If you carry or use your phone in a pants or shirt pocket or tucked 
into a bra when the phone is ON and connected to a wireless net-
work, you may exceed the federal guidelines for exposure to RF ra-
diation.”2 
 
“The products in this case that contain or may contain milk from 
rBST-treated cows either (1) state on the package that rBST has 
been or may have been used, or (2) are identified by a blue shelf 
label . . . or (3) a blue sticker on the package . . . .”3 
 
These three statements are examples of government mandated 
compelled commercial speech disclosures. Currently, compelled 
commercial speech jurisprudence is unclear, at best. The Supreme 
Court has given clearer guidance, however, on the constitutionality 
of prohibited commercial speech. 
In Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of 
N.Y., the Supreme Court held that a regulation that completely bans 
an electric utility company from advertising to promote the use of 
electricity violated the First Amendment after failing to satisfy a 
four-part analysis.4 In its four-part analysis, the Court asked (1) 
whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment, noting 
that it “at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading”; 
(2) “whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial”; (3) 
“whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest 
asserted”; and (4) “whether it is not more extensive than is necessary 
to serve that interest.”5 Thereby, a prohibition on commercial 
                                                                                                             
 1 Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 871 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 
2017). 
 2 CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 854 F.3d 1105, 1111 (9th 
Cir. 2017). 
 3 Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 4 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 566–71 (1980). 
 5 Id. at 566 (“At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is 
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that 
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speech is subject to intermediate scrutiny, and, accordingly, any cur-
tailing of speech must be justified by a substantial government in-
terest.6 
Roughly five years later, in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel, the Supreme Court provided guidance on specific in-
stances in which the government may compel commercial speech. 
The Court held that a requirement that the purveyor of a good or 
service disclose “factual and uncontroversial” information is consti-
tutional so long as the requirement is not unduly burdensome, and 
the requirement is “reasonably related to the State’s interest in pre-
venting deception of consumers.”7 This holding applied a more le-
nient rational basis test, as opposed to Central Hudson’s intermedi-
ate scrutiny test, when “factual and uncontroversial” information 
was compelled to cure deception of consumers.8 
Since Zauderer, the Court has upheld compelled commercial 
speech under the Zauderer rational basis test, when the speech is 
curing deception of consumers, and struck down compelled com-
mercial speech under the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny test, 
when the speech is not curing deception of consumers. In Milavetz, 
Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 9 the Supreme Court up-
held a regulation that required certain debt-relief assistance profes-
sionals to disclose in their advertising that their services were related 
to bankruptcy relief and to further identify themselves as “debt-re-
lief agencies.”10 The Supreme Court explained that the advertising 
was misleading because it offered “debt relief without any reference 
                                                                                                             
provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we 
ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries 
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly ad-
vances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive 
than is necessary to serve that interest.”). 
 6 See id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 7 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (em-
phasis added). 
 8 See id. at 638 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 566) (noting that 
“[c]ommercial speech that is not false or deceptive and does not concern unlawful 
activities, however, may be restricted only in the service of a substantial govern-
mental interest, and only through means that directly advance that interest.”); 
Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 554 (6th Cir. 
2012). 
 9 559 U.S. 229, 232 (2010). 
 10 Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 232. 
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to the possibility of filing for bankruptcy, which has inherent 
costs.”11 The Court noted, however, that the “same characteristics of 
[the Milavetz regulation] that make it analogous to the rule in Zau-
derer serve to distinguish it from those at issue in In re R.M.J.,12 to 
which the Court applied the intermediate scrutiny of Central Hud-
son.”13 According to the Milavetz Court, the R.M.J. regulations, 
which required that attorneys advertise their practice in terms pre-
scribed by the State Supreme Court, were improper.14 The State had 
failed to show that the advertisements were themselves likely to mis-
lead consumers.15 In contrast with R.M.J., the Milavetz Court con-
cluded that “[e]vidence in the congressional record demonstrating a 
pattern of advertisements that hold out the promise of debt relief 
without alerting consumers to its potential cost . . . is adequate to 
establish that the likelihood of deception in this case ‘is hardly a 
speculative one.’”16 
Despite this guidance, since the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Zauderer, federal appellate courts have applied the holding incon-
sistently—some courts have limited Zauderer’s rational basis appli-
cation to compelled commercial speech disclosures that are “factual 
and uncontroversial” and cure deception of consumers;17 while 
                                                                                                             
 11 Id. at 250. 
 12 455 U.S. 191 (1982). 
 13 Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 250. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 251 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 
626, 652 (1985)). 
 17 See Ocheesee Creamery LLC v. Putnam, 851 F.3d 1228, 1235–36 (11th 
Cir. 2017) (noting that a speech restriction that neither concerns unlawful activity 
nor is inherently misleading may only be regulated if it satisfies intermediate scru-
tiny); Dwyer v. Cappell, 762 F.3d 275, 281–83 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that a 
guideline could not compel commercial speech on legal advertisements when the 
guideline did not require disclosing anything that could reasonably remedy con-
sumer deception); Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of 
Balt., 721 F.3d 264, 283 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that “[d]isclosure requirements 
aimed at misleading commercial speech need only survive rational basis scrutiny, 
by being ‘reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of con-
sumers.’”); Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. La. Attorney Disciplinary Bd., 632 F.3d 212, 218 
(5th Cir. 2011) (holding that a regulation that imposes a disclosure obligation on 
a potentially misleading legal advertisement will survive First Amendment review 
if the required disclosure (1) passes intermediate scrutiny or (2), if the ad is related 
to preventing consumer deception and passes rational basis); Milavetz, Gallop & 
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other courts have applied it to all compelled commercial speech dis-
closures that are “factual and uncontroversial” regardless of whether 
the speech cures deception of consumers.18 The latter courts note 
that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Zauderer “seems inherently 
applicable beyond the problem of deception, as other circuits have 
found.”19 
Compelled commercial speech should be subject to Central 
Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny test unless the speech falls within 
Zauderer’s ambit because commercial speech is protected speech, 
and “the First Amendment protects against speech compulsions just 
                                                                                                             
Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 541 F.3d 785, 796 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that a 
requirement that professionals assisting consumers with bankruptcy must state 
that they are a debt relief agency in their ads is constitutional because the speech 
in question was directed at misleading commercial speech); Pharm. Care Mgmt. 
Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 310 (1st Cir. 2005) (upholding, under rational basis 
review, mandated disclosures by pharmacy benefit managers (PBM) of economi-
cally significant information designed to protect covered entities from questiona-
ble PBM business practices); Cent. Ill. Light Co. v. Citizens Util. Bd., 827 F.2d 
1169, 1173 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that a mandatory commercial disclosure was 
unconstitutional when it was not justified by consumer deception, but by a legiti-
mate state police power interest). 
 18 See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 871 F.3d 884, 891–92 (9th 
Cir. 2017) (holding that Zauderer’s “framework applies when a state requires dis-
closures for a different state interest, such as to promote public health” by requir-
ing warnings about health effects of certain sugar-sweetened beverages); Am. 
Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that 
compelling “country of origin labeling,” while not necessary to cure deception, is 
subject to rational basis scrutiny); Safelite Grp., Inc. v. Jepsen, 764 F.3d 258, 263–
66 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that a requirement that a corporation disclose the name 
of a competitor’s repair shop to customers fell outside Zauderer’s “factual and 
uncontroversial” bounds); Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 
674 F.3d 509, 554–55 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that Zauderer allows mandated dis-
closures that serve “some substantial interest”); N.Y. State Rest. v. N.Y. City Bd. 
of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 117–18, 132 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding a New York City 
regulation that required certain restaurants to post calorie content information on 
menus and menu boards that were not previously deceptive under rational basis 
review); United States v. Wenger, 427 F.3d 840, 844, 849–50 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(noting that despite being upheld as part of the federal government’s broad powers 
to regulate securities, section 17(b)’s disclosure requirements would have been 
upheld as a regulation on commercial speech; even when the government has not 
shown that absent the required disclosure the speech would be false or deceptive, 
and even when the disclosure requirement serves some substantial government 
interest other than preventing deception, such as fraud prevention). 
 19 Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 22. 
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as it protects against speech limitations.”20 Accordingly, compelled 
commercial speech is a subset of commercial speech generally and 
should receive the same constitutional protection.21 It is not a sepa-
rate category of speech under the First Amendment.22 This protec-
tion of commercial speech, which upholds compulsions under ra-
tional basis review when speech is misleading, will allow govern-
ment efforts to protect consumers, when necessary, and will allow 
consumers to obtain information they desire about products and ser-
vices.23 “A dynamic market discovery process, with only limited 
and targeted government interventions, is a more effective way to 
serve the consumer interest in obtaining more complete information 
about goods and services.”24 
To that end, Zauderer should be narrowly interpreted in that ra-
tional basis should apply only if the advertisement is misleading or 
deceptive because (1) the alternative—applying rational basis when 
the compelled disclosure is “factual and uncontroversial”—is un-
workable and leads to inconsistent court rulings; (2) moreover, ap-
plying rational basis to such large swaths of disclosures may lead to 
compelling too much information, compelling the wrong kind of in-
formation, or bolstering the government’s ideological beliefs be-
cause there will always be a legitimate government interest to com-
pel, i.e. the consumer “right to know.” 
This Comment argues that the proper application of Zauderer 
rational basis is a two-step inquiry. First, the court must ask if the 
commercial speech is deceptive or misleading.25 If the commercial 
                                                                                                             
 20 Jonathan H. Adler, Opinion, “Compelled Commercial Speech and the Con-




 21 Jonathan H. Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer 
“Right to Know”, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 421, 421 (2016) [hereinafter Adler, Compelled 
Commercial Speech]. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 “There are three general categories of commercial speech: non-misleading, 
potentially misleading, and misleading. The more misleading the advertisement, 
the more constitutional leeway is granted the States in restricting it.” Dwyer v. 
Cappell, 762 F.3d 275, 280 (3d Cir. 2014). In this context, “[c]ommercial speech 
that is not false, deceptive, or misleading” may only be restricted if the regulation 
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speech is not deceptive or misleading, intermediate scrutiny should 
be applied. If the commercial speech is deceptive or misleading, the 
court must ask if the compelled commercial speech is “factual and 
uncontroversial” speech intended to cure the deception. If so, ra-
tional basis should apply. Otherwise, intermediate scrutiny should 
apply. 
The second part of this Comment will discuss the background of 
the commercial speech doctrine—detailing the three eras of com-
mercial speech, why commercial speech is protected, and how the 
First Amendment core values are affected by commercial and com-
pelled commercial speech, respectively. It will also detail the semi-
nal case Zauderer and the circuit splits that exist in Zauderer’s ap-
plication. The third part of this Comment will advocate for narrow-
ing Zauderer’s application to “factual and uncontroversial” speech 




The First Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peace-
ably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”26 This amendment prohibits laws abridging the free-
                                                                                                             
withstands intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson. Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of 
Bus. & Prof’l Reg., 512 U.S. 136, 142 (1994). States may prohibit potentially 
misleading ads, but only if the information cannot be presented in a way that is 
not deceptive (such as through adding a disclosure requirement). In re R.M.J., 455 
U.S. 191, 203 (1982). Advertising that is inherently misleading or has proven to 
be misleading in practice “may be prohibited entirely.” Id. To repeat in another 
way, restrictions on speech get protection under the Constitution inversely pro-
portional to the deceptiveness of the target advertisement. This note covers mis-
leading speech, inherently misleading speech, and potentially misleading speech 
that cannot be presented in a way that is not deceptive when it references speech 
that is “deceptive” or “misleading.” 
 26 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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dom of speech, which, “as a general matter[,] means that govern-
ment has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its 
ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”27 
The Supreme Court has held, generally, that when the speech in 
question is protected, it is held to the same standard of review re-
gardless of whether it is compelled or prohibited.28 Therefore, the 
First Amendment guaranty of free speech “includes the right to re-
frain from speaking,” subject only to the warranted level of state 
interest required to support the restriction or regulation in the partic-
ular context.29 Commercial speech is generally held to an interme-
diate scrutiny standard of review.30 Nonetheless, compelled com-
mercial speech may be held to a rational basis standard of review 
when it cures deception of consumers.31 
1. THREE ERAS OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
There are arguably three eras of Supreme Court jurisprudence 
on commercial speech; demonstrating that, historically, the Su-
preme Court has disfavored protecting commercial speech.32 
                                                                                                             
 27 Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 564 U.S. 117, 121 (2011) (quoting 
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)). 
 28 See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797 
(1988) (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)) 
(“[T]he right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary 
components of the broader concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.’”); see also 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 657–58 (1985) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 29 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714, 716 (1977). 
 30 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 557, 563, 584, 596, 598 (1980). 
 31 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652. 
 32 See generally Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 564 (2011) (ex-
plaining that because the law at issue regulated speech based on its content, 
heightened scrutiny was appropriate, irrespective of whether the law involved 
commercial speech); Cent. Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 568–71 (1980) (upholding 
some protection for commercial speech—essentially intermediate protection); Va. 
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
771–72 (1976) (holding that as long as the advertisement was truthful and not 
advertising anything illegal, the First Amendment should protect it); Valentine v. 
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54–55 (1942) (holding that commercial speech was not 
entitled to First Amendment protection). 
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Initially, the Supreme Court provided commercial speech with 
no First Amendment protections.33 The Court reasoned that the 
broad commerce clause powers of the government must reasonably 
include the power to regulate speech concerning articles of com-
merce.34 In Valentine v. Chrestensen, the Court officially held that 
commercial speech was not entitled to First Amendment protec-
tions.35 In its decision, the Court distinguished speech that is of pub-
lic interest and speech that is for private profit.36 The Court kept this 
prohibition on protection in place in large part until 1976’s Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc.,37 which overturned Valentine. 
The second era of commercial speech jurisprudence, which can 
be considered the Central Hudson era, was ushered in with Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the 
Commonwealth of Virginia passed a law making it illegal for phar-
macists to advertise prices of prescription medicine, as doing so 
could promote aggressive advertising that would ultimately hurt 
consumers by diminishing the service pharmacists could provide.38 
A consumer group challenged the law, saying that citizens had a 
right to the price information.39 In a 7–1 ruling, the Court overturned 
the law, noting that the distinction between regular speech and com-
mercial speech was “simplistic.”40 The real issue, the Court said, 
was that the speech itself satisfied the public interest by preserving 
the free flow of information: 
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enter-
prise economy, the allocation of our resources in 
                                                                                                             
 33 See Dayna B. Royal, Resolving the Compelled-Commercial-Speech Co-
nundrum, 19 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 205, 213 (2011) (citing Valentine, 316 U.S. 
at 54). 
 34 See Valentine, 316 U.S. at 53–55. 
 35 Id. at 54–55. 
 36 See id. at 54–55. Subsequently, the Court’s rationale for affording com-
mercial speech more protection continued to center on satisfying the public inter-
est by preserving free flow of information. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 
U.S. at 763–65. 
 37 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 38 See id. at 748–49, 754–56. 
 39 See id. at 748, 756. 
 40 Id. at 758–60. 
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large measure will be made through numerous pri-
vate economic decisions. It is a matter of public in-
terest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intel-
ligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow 
of commercial information is indispensable.41 
The Court held that as long as the advertisement was truthful and 
not advertising something illegal, the First Amendment should pro-
tect it.42 The court noted that although commercial speech should 
receive some First Amendment protection, it should not receive the 
same level of protection as other speech.43 “Less explicit in the 
Court’s decision . . . was the recognition that commercial speech can 
also serve to advance the broader interests of democratic self-gov-
ernance” and self-expression or autonomy.44 In this second era of 
commercial speech, the Court provided some commercial speech 
protection—essentially intermediate protection—on the basis that 
this speech may help further consumer’s interest in the free flow of 
                                                                                                             
 41 Id. at 763–65. 
 42 See id. at 771–72. 
 43 See id. at 771–73, 771 n.24. 
 44 Jonathan H. Adler, Persistent Threats to Commercial Speech, 25 J.L. & 
POL’Y 289, 295, 295 n.28 (2016) [hereinafter Persistent Threats]; accord Robert 
Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 
CAL. L. REV. 2353, 2372 (2000) [hereinafter Reconciling Theory] (recognizing 
the relationship between commercial information and democratic self-govern-
ance); Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and 
the Twilight Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67, 81 
(2007) (“[S]peech concerning commercial products and services can facilitate pri-
vate self-government in much the same way that political speech fosters collective 
self-government.”); Daniel E. Troy, Advertising: Not “Low Value” Speech, 16 
YALE J. ON REG. 85, 100, 100 n.73 (1999) (challenging the notion that commer-
cial information or advertising is less valuable than other forms of speech). 
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commercial information.45  The free flow of commercial infor-
mation, in turn, guarantees the capacity for democratic self-govern-
ance and self-expression or autonomy.46 
The third era of commercial speech has been ushered in over the 
past two decades, as the Court has ratcheted up the level of protec-
tion for commercial speech under the First Amendment, while none-
theless disagreeing about the level of protection that it should be af-
forded.47 Commercial speech jurisprudence in this third era 
acknowledges the consumer interests that justify the preservation of 
a diverse marketplace of ideas about goods and services.48 Justice 
Thomas has stated that commercial speech should be protected to 
the same extent as other forms of speech49: “I do not see a philo-
sophical or historical basis for asserting that ‘commercial’ speech is 
of ‘lower value’ than ‘noncommercial’ speech. Indeed, some histor-
ical materials suggest to the contrary.”50 Additionally, he has stated, 
                                                                                                             
 45 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 557, 563, 584, 596, 598 (1980) (“The free flow of information is important 
in this context not because it will lead to the discovery of any objective ‘truth,’ 
but because it is essential to our system of self-government.”); Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 760 (noting that speech has value in the marketplace of 
ideas). 
 46 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765, 777; see also N.Y. Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964). 
 47 See Royal, supra note 33, at 214–15; Persistent Threats, supra note 44, at 
291, 291 n.9 (citing Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002)) (af-
fording more protection for commercial speech by invalidating prohibitions on 
pharmacy advertising for drug compounding and noting that “[n]ot all commen-
tators see this as a positive development”). 
 48 Persistent Threats, supra note 44, at 291, 291 n.10; accord Sorrell v. IMS 
Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 579 (2011) (“The commercial marketplace, like other 
spheres of our social and cultural life, provides a forum where ideas and infor-
mation flourish. Some of the ideas and information are vital, some of slight worth. 
But the general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the government, 
assess the value of the information presented.”). 
 49 Cf. Sorrell, 546 U.S. at 564–66, 572, 593 (explaining that because the law 
at issue regulated speech based on its content, heightened scrutiny was appropri-
ate, irrespective of whether the law involved commercial speech. In the end, the 
Court applied the more lenient Central Hudson test that it frequently applies to 
commercial speech, reasoning that because the regulation could not withstand 
even Central Hudson scrutiny, it was unnecessary to apply heightened scrutiny.) 
 50 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522, 522–23 n.4 (1996) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (citing, among other sources, 19th and 20th century 
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“[i]n my view, an asserted government interest in keeping people 
ignorant by suppressing expression ‘is per se illegitimate and can no 
more justify regulation of ‘commercial’ speech than it can justify 
regulation of ‘noncommercial speech.’”51 It is possible that the 
Court may adopt his view. 
A majority of the Court recently entertained Justice Thomas’ po-
sition when, in dicta, it explained that heightened scrutiny was ap-
propriate, irrespective of whether the law involved commercial 
speech.52 The Court noted that the law at issue regulated speech 
based on its content.53 Nonetheless, “[i]n the end, . . . the Court ap-
plied the more lenient Central Hudson test,” reasoning that it was 
unnecessary to apply heightened scrutiny “because the regulation 
could not withstand even Central Hudson scrutiny.”54 
2. WHY PROTECT COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND PREVENT COMPELLED 
COMMERCIAL SPEECH? 
Commercial speech should be protected because doing so is con-
sistent with three core First Amendment values: “(1) . . . en-
courag[ing] a diverse marketplace of ideas” and the free flow of in-
formation; “(2) . . . facilitat[ing] participatory democracy; and (3)     
. . . promot[ing] individual autonomy, self-expression, and self-re-
alization.”55 The rationales for protecting commercial speech are 
similar to the rationales for curtailing compelled commercial 
speech.56 These three core First Amendment values, however, are 
jeopardized in additional ways when compelling commercial 
speech, as discussed below. 
                                                                                                             
cases in which freedom of the press was cited to preclude Congress from prevent-
ing the circulation of lottery advertising through methods other than the United 
States mail). 
 51 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (quoting 44 Liquormart Inc., 517 U.S at 487). 
 52 Royal, supra note 33, at 215 (citing Sorrell, 546 U.S. at 564–67). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. (citing Sorrell, 546 U.S. at 564–67, 588–89). 
 55 Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 
1291–92 (2014); accord Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial 
Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 11 (2000) [hereinafter Constitutional Status of Com-
mercial Speech]. 
 56 See Corbin, supra note 55, at 1291–92; see also Constitutional Status of 
Commercial Speech, supra note 55, at 10–11. 
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a. Encourage a Diverse Marketplace of Ideas 
The value of a diverse “marketplace of ideas” is in the advance-
ment of truth through the free flow of information and opinions.57 
The First Amendment aims to “preserve an uninhibited marketplace 
of ideas in which the truth will ultimately prevail” by ensuring the 
“right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, es-
thetic, moral and other ideas and experiences.” 58 This may not be 
constitutionally abridged.59 
1. Commercial Speech 
Commercial speech should be protected to cure asymmetry of 
information.60 Commercial speakers are in the best position to com-
municate important information to consumers that they would not 
ordinarily know in making consumption decisions.61 In providing 
important commercial information, commercial speakers contribute 
to the market place of ideas.62 While some commercial information 
may be of slight worth, “the general rule is that the speaker and the 
audience, not the government, assess the value of the information 
presented.”63 People will perceive their own best interests only if 
they are sufficiently well informed.64 “[T]he best means to that end 
                                                                                                             
 57 Vernon R. Pearson & Michael O’Neill, The First Amendment, Commercial 
Speech, and the Advertising Lawyer, 9 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 293, 296 (1986). 
 58 Id. at 296 n.16. 
 59 Id. 
 60 See Victor Brudney, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53 
B.C. L. REV. 1153, 1165 (2012). 
 61 Alan Howard, The Constitutionality of Deceptive Speech Regulations: Re-
placing the Commercial Speech Doctrine with a Tort-Based Relational Frame-
work, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1093, 1113 (1991). 
 62 See Brudney, note 60, at 1202–04, 1211; see also Constitutional Status of 
Commercial Speech, supra note 55, at 14–15. 
 63 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993) (“The commercial market-
place, like other spheres of our social and cultural life, provides a forum where 
ideas and information flourish. Some of the ideas and information are vital, some 
of slight worth . . . . [E]ven a communication that does no more than propose a 
commercial transaction is entitled to the coverage of the First Amendment.”). 
 64 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 763–65, 770 (1976); Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 766 (noting that a ban 
on commercial speech “threatens societal interests in broad access to complete 
and accurate commercial information”). See also Bianca Nunes, Note, The Future 
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is to open the channels of communication rather than to close 
them.”65 
2. Compelled Commercial Speech 
Compelled commercial speech should be curtailed because it 
forces commercial speech participation, thereby distorting the mar-
ketplace of ideas. Distortion does not mean “under-representation” 
or “over-representation” of particular viewpoints.66 Instead, it refers 
to the introduction of error into the marketplace of ideas.67 “Com-
pelled speech can lead to error if its content is inaccurate or mislead-
ing or if its context fails to make clear whether the message is the 
government’s or the compelled speaker’s.”68 Audiences, too, will 
suffer as distortion in the marketplace of ideas hinders the capacity 
for effective and accurate democratic self-governance and self-ex-
pression or autonomy.69 
Compelled commercial speech also distorts the market place of 
ideas by chilling speech and causing a deprivation to the market 
place of ideas.70 “[F]or example, a speaker may decide not to speak 
at all if her speech must include the state’s compelled message.”71 
Audiences, too, will suffer as a result of never hearing what that 
                                                                                                             
of Government-Mandated Health Warnings After R.J. Reynolds and American 
Meat Institute, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 177, 181–82 (2014). 
 65 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770. 
 66 Corbin, supra note 55, at 1294. “Compelled speech does not inevitably 
distort the discourse. Quite the contrary: a compelled disclosure may clarify oth-
erwise misleading speech.” Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765, 777; see also N.Y. Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964). 
 70 Corbin, supra note 55, at 1344. Compelled commercial speech does not 
inevitably deprive the marketplace of ideas. In the context of centers that are 
forced to espouse pro-life views, Corbin has stated, “[i]t is possible that some 
Centers may decide to curtail their advertisements if forced to disclose their pro-
life point of view. However, since they had not highlighted these pro-life beliefs 
in their advertisements in the first place, no viewpoint will disappear from the 
marketplace of ideas.” Id. 
 71 Id. at 1293–94. 
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speaker might have said.72 This will hinder public debate and “un-
intentionally undermine rather than advance the free speech goal of 
[providing] more information, opinions, and views.”73 
b. Facilitate Participatory Democracy 
“Participatory democracy” is a two-prong American free speech 
value that (1) assures “an informed electorate” by “allow[ing] citi-
zens to learn about the public affairs of the day” in order to make 
well-informed decisions74 and (2) assures “the opportunity for indi-
viduals to participate in the speech by which [they] govern them-
selves.”75 
1. Commercial Speech 
Commercial speech should be protected “because it circulates 
information necessary for the education of those who participate in 
                                                                                                             
 72 Id. at 1294 (citing Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 
(1974) (striking right to reply statute on free press grounds)). 
 73 Id. In Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, the potential loss of speech led 
the Supreme Court to invalidate a right of reply law. See generally Miami Herald 
Publ’g, 418 U.S. at 241. A Florida statute, which aimed to ensure balanced cov-
erage, required “that after a newspaper attacked a political candidate, it must allow 
the criticized candidate to respond.” Corbin, supra note 55, at 1294; accord Miami 
Herald Publ’g, 418 U.S. at 244. “The Court worried that rather than be forced to 
let others use their pages, the newspapers might temper their political criticisms, 
thereby [hindering] the vigor of public debate.” Corbin, supra note 55, at 1294; 
accord Miami Herald Publ’g, 418 U.S. at 257. 
 74 Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Lis-
tening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 969–70 (2009); accord Rodney A. Smolla, Freedom 
of Speech for Libraries and Librarians, 85 LAW LIBR. J. 71, 77 (1993) (“[T]he 
First Amendment protects not only individual self-expression, but also the right 
to receive information and ideas. The right to receive inures in the right to send, 
for without both a listener and a speaker, freedom of expression is as empty as the 
sound of one hand clapping.”). 
 75 James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of Amer-
ican Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 491, 498 (2011); accord Corbin, 
supra note 55 at 1293–94 (quoting Reconciling Theory, supra note 44, at 2368) 
(“[C]rucial to democratic self-determination is ‘the ability of individual citizens 
to participate in the formation of public opinion.’”); Constitutional Status of Com-
mercial Speech, supra note 55, at 12–13. 
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public discourse.”76 Any information contributes to what is neces-
sary for participatory democracy, regardless of whether the speaker 
is a company or individual.77 
2. Compelled Commercial Speech 
Compelled commercial speech should be curtailed because it 
does not facilitate a participatory democracy in that the speaker is 
not participating out of desire. It is forced participation, conveying 
forced content.78 “[I]n order for our democracy ‘of the people, by 
the people, for the people’ to work, the people need the ability to 
shape political debate . . . .”79 If the speaker is not the origin of the 
message, the political debate is distorted. Additionally, compelled 
commercial speech may chill speech, as stated above, thereby limit-
ing people’s ability to participate in political discourse and under-
mining what makes this nation a democracy—the ability of all citi-
zens to vote for policymakers and voice their opinions on what those 
policies should be.80 
As stated above, audiences, too, will suffer as the speaker’s 
forced participation, or lack thereof, may lead to distortion or depri-
vation in the public debate, thereby hindering its vigor.81 
                                                                                                             
 76 Robert Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 867, 
874–75 (2015) [hereinafter Post, Compelled Commercial Speech]. 
 77 See id.; Brudney, supra note 60, at 1157–58 (noting that “commercial 
speech . . . is ‘enriched,’ in that it does more than simply articulate the terms of 
the proposed transaction”); see also Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993). 
 78 See Corbin, supra note 55, at 1295 (noting that compelled speech misrep-
resents true views of speakers and may lead an audience to credit it more than 
they would have otherwise). 
 79 Id. at 1292. 
 80 See id. at 1292–95 (noting that compelled commercial speech chills speech 
and stifles self-expression of the speaker). “It also limits people’s ability to par-
ticipate in political discourse, and what makes the nation a democracy is not just 
that everyone gets to vote for policymakers, but that everyone gets to put in their 
two cents worth on what those policies should be.” Id. at 1293. 
 81 Id. at 1293–95 (“The government could also distort the discourse by mis-
representing the true views of speakers. For example, if the government forces 
speakers to convey an opinion they disagree with, and if an audience believes that 
the message is the private speakers’ rather than the government’s, the audience 
may erroneously conclude that the message is more widespread than it really is. 
This mistaken view will make audiences credit it more than they would have oth-
erwise, as studies show that the perceived popularity of a message can increase 
its persuasiveness.”). 
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c. To Promote Individual Autonomy, Self-Expression, and 
Self-Realization 
“At the most basic level, free speech autonomy means being able 
to decide what one says: compelled speech ‘violates the fundamen-
tal rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has 
the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.’”82 
1. Speaker 
A. COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
The justifications for affording First Amendment protection to 
commercial speakers on the basis of “promot[ing] individual auton-
omy, self-expression, and self-realization” are weak,83 but have 
been upheld by courts.84 It is undisputed that companies have free 
speech rights, but the rationale varies.85 
Free speech rights for companies have been rationalized a vari-
ety of ways. One rationale is the company’s inherent autonomy and 
ability to determine the content of its speech.86 “A corporation 
speaks by hiring someone to create speech or to write for it.”87 The 
notion that the individual controls what she says and what she thinks 
“does not lose its protection because of the corporate identity of the 
speaker.”88 Another rationale for companies’ free speech rights is 
that “corporations are sometimes legally recognized as ‘persons’—
                                                                                                             
 82 Id. at 1299 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of 
Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995)). 
 83 Id. at 1285, 1291 (noting that commercial speech is economically moti-
vated). But see Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, supra note 55, at 6–
7, 10–12. 
 84 See Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 342–43 
(2010) (holding that the First Amendment does not allow prohibitions of speech 
based on the identity of the speaker); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759, 2768 (2014). For an overview on Supreme Court case 
law on corporate speech, see John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech & the First 
Amendment: History, Data, and Implications, 30 CONST. COMMENT 223, 248–54 
(2015). 
 85 Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not 
Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995, 1000–01 (1998). 
 86 See Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2768; see also Corbin, supra note 55, at 1299. 
 87 Greenwood, supra note 85, at 1056. 
 88 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986). 
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such as a ‘person’ with a right to contract89—when ‘personhood’ 
enables them to fulfill their economic purpose.”90 A third rationale 
is that the individual people that make-up companies have autonomy 
rights.91 In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Court, in refer-
ence to the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, held that when 
rights are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the 
rights of people, including shareholders, officers, and employees as-
sociated with the corporation in one way or another.92 
B. COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
Compelled commercial speech should be curtailed, under the 
three aforementioned autonomy rationales for protecting commer-
cial speech, to promote speaker autonomy by ensuring that the 
speaker rather than the government controls what she says and what 
she thinks. A person is not autonomous in body or thought if forced 
to speak, and state a belief with which she disagrees, when she 
would prefer to remain silent. 93 Additionally, speakers may suffer 
the harm of misattribution if listeners regard the government’s opin-
ion as the speaker’s opinion.94 Free speech autonomy calls for the 
ability to decide what one says: “compelled speech ‘violates the fun-
damental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a 
speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own mes-
sage.’”95 The choice to speak encompasses the choice of what not to 
say for both individuals and corporations.96 
                                                                                                             
 89 Corbin, supra note 55, at 1315 (quoting Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Wood-
ward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819)) (recognizing corporations’ right to contract); see also 
Cty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 409 (1886) (recognizing cor-
porations’ right to protection under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 90 Corbin, supra note 55, at 1315 (quoting Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporate 
First Amendment Rights After Citizens United: An Analysis of the Popular Move-
ment to End the Constitutional Personhood of Corporations, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
209, 221–22 (2011)). 
 91 See Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2768. 
 92 Id. 
 93 See Corbin, supra note 55, at 1298–99 (citing Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay 
Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995)). 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986) 
(“For corporations[,] as for individuals, the choice to speak includes within it the 
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2. Listener 
A. COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
Commercial speech should be protected because democratic 
self-governance and knowledge of commercial affairs is integral to 
“promot[ing] individual autonomy, self-expression, and self-reali-
zation” for the listener.97 The listener should be able to receive any 
information that will contribute to her ability to make well-informed 
consumer decisions.98 
If the government curtails the available information, it is influ-
encing the individual’s ability to decide and create his or her own 
self-identity/governance. The First Amendment protects “speech 
that more directly engages an individual’s autonomy interest in per-
sonal self-realization by protecting utterances and receipt of expres-
sion that serve any and all personal interests.”99 It is strongly argued 
that the experience in uttering, receiving, and considering commer-
cial speech has such value.100 
Accordingly, commercial speech may be enriched, “in that it 
does more than simply articulate the terms of the proposed transac-
tion or describe the identified products or services.”101 Commercial 
                                                                                                             
choice of what not to say.”); see also Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 
supra note 55, at 26. 
 97 Corbin, supra note 55, at 1291, 1300–08, 1347. 
 98 See id. at 1292; Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 76, at 874–75; 
see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 763–65 (1976). 
 99 See Brudney, supra note 60, at 1164 n.32. 
 100 See Persistent Threats, supra note 44, at 298–99; Robert Post, Recuperat-
ing First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1272–73 (1995) [herein-
after Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine]; see also Martin H. Redish, Value 
of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 606–07 (1982); David A. J. Richards, 
Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 
123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 76–77 (1974); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, 
and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 345 (1991). 
 101 Persistent Threats, supra note 44, at 298–99; Brudney, supra note 60, at 
1157–59, 1211–13; see also Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, supra note 
100, at 1272–73; Redish, supra note 100, at 606–07; Strauss, supra note 100, at 
345; Richards, supra note 100, at 76–77. For example, purchasing a product can 
be an ethical or political act. Consider the consumer who buys a Prius or insists 
upon shopping at a “socially reasonable” store. See Persistent Threats, supra note 
44, at 299. 
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speech may also communicate supplementary expressions about 
personal or social preferences.102 These supplementary expressions 
reflect “matters of collective or public interest to society and engage 
. . . the interest of . . . the audience in considering such matters in 
addition to . . . making the purchase.”103 
The First Amendment aims to protect this persuasive or informa-
tive speech from government regulation in order to facilitate soci-
ety’s collective actions and nurture social attitudes and values. De-
spite the fact that commercial speech persuades or informs mainly 
to prompt the purchase of a service or product for a consumer’s own 
consumption or enjoyment,104 “individual choices driven by concep-
tions of self-benefit may result in imitative, or even aggregate, com-
munal choices by individuals.”105 
B. COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
Compelled commercial speech should be curtailed because anti-
paternalism—the idea that the government should not decide what 
information audiences can or cannot access—underlies our free 
speech jurisprudence.106 “The First Amendment directs us to be es-
pecially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark 
for what the government perceives to be their own good.”107 
While compelled speech seems to escape this particular concern 
since the government is not restricting information but providing 
                                                                                                             
 102 Persistent Threats, supra note 44, at 298–99; Brudney, supra note 60, at 
1157–59, 1211–13 (“[I]t may promote the seller’s products or services by high-
lighting their health and safety benefits, or ego-enhancing features, or public pol-
icy benefits for society.”); see also Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, su-
pra note 100, at 1272–73; Redish, supra note 100, at 606–07; Richards, supra 
note 100, at 76–77; Strauss, supra note 100, at 345. For example, purchasing a 
product can be an ethical or political act. Consider the consumer who buys a Prius 
or insists upon shopping at a “socially reasonable” store. See Persistent Threats, 
supra note 44, at 299. 
 103 Brudney, supra note 60, at 1176. 
 104 Id. at 1185. 
 105 See id. at 1185 n.100. Returning to the Prius example mentioned above, 
Prius’ are common in Los Angeles where environment sustainability is a concern 
among many. An individual buying a Prius could communicate a message about 
his or her environmental and possibly political affiliations. Others may imitate 
that behavior to convey a similar message. 
 106 See Corbin, supra note 55, at 1300. 
 107 Id. (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 546 U.S. 552, 577 (2011)). 
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more of it,108 government-compelled commercial speech may 
threaten listener autonomy through paternalistic ends and manipu-
lative means.109 Distrust of the government, while not a First 
Amendment core value, is an underlying principle relevant to this 
inquiry.110 
d. Distrust of Government 
As Justice Scalia stated, “it is safer to assume that the people are 
smart enough to get the information they need than to assume that 
the government is wise or impartial enough to make the judgment 
for them.”111 
Paternalistic ends in government-mandated disclosures are evi-
dent when the government “crosses the line when it compels disclo-
sures not to inform, but to persuade.”112 It is less concerning when 
the state uses its coercive power to provide information that clarifies 
or information that is in the exclusive possession of the speaker and 
more concerning when the state uses its coercive power to compel 
disclosures in order to convince the audience to do what the state 
thinks is right.113 
However, interference may be acceptable in certain situations. 
“Even those possessing [a] strong sense of autonomy . . . would 
probably agree that compelling additional information that cor-
rect[s] the speaker’s false or misleading speech does not illegiti-
mately interfere with the intended beneficiary’s autonomy.”114 
                                                                                                             
 108 Id. at 1301 (quoting Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 
U.S. 136, 142 (1994)) (noting that compelled disclosures are preferable to censor-
ship as “disclosure of truthful, relevant information is more likely to make a pos-
itive contribution to decisionmaking than is concealment of such information”). 
 109 Id. at 1301. 
 110 Id. at 1292, 1301–04. 
 111 Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 804 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
 112 Corbin, supra note 55, at 1302. 
 113 See id. Admittedly, “not every state attempt to persuade sufficiently re-
spects the audience’s autonomy. The government’s goal makes a difference. Most 
suspect is when the state urges a course of action that actually detracts from the 
audience’s autonomy.” Id. at 1303. As an example, “[u]rging people not to 
vote . . . would seem to undermine rather than enhance people’s autonomy.” Id. 
 114 Id. at 1302 (noting that the government compelled warnings would not be 
paternalistic if the mandated information consisted of accurate facts meant to in-
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Compelled speech might undermine the free speech goal of au-
tonomous decision-making even when the government’s end is jus-
tified by relying on illegitimate and manipulative means. “The . . . 
question is whether and when appeals . . . rise to the level of ‘ma-
nipulation.’”115 The government may manipulate audiences (1) in-
tentionally, when it compels false or misleading speech, or (2) 
through misattribution, when it fails to make clear that the infor-
mation represents the government’s opinion and not the speaker’s 
opinion.116 This form of “deception amounts to a ‘denial of auton-
omy’ because it ‘interfere[s] with a person’s control over her own 
reasoning processes.’”117 
Accordingly, an audience may erroneously conclude that a mes-
sage is more widespread than it really is if it believes that the mes-
sage is the private speakers’ rather than the government’s.118 This 
may lead an audience to credit the opinion more than they would 
have otherwise.119 “In such cases, the government uses its coercive 
power to persuade not by virtue of the underlying worthiness of its 
message, but by taking advantage of misattribution and a heuris-
tic.”120 
                                                                                                             
form, rather than influence, the audience’s decision making; especially if the in-
formation cured a potentially misleading or deceptive advertisement, or if the in-
formation were not otherwise available). 
 115 Id. at 1304. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. (quoting Strauss, supra note 100, at 354). 
 118 Id. at 1295. 
 119 See id. (noting that as studies show that the perceived popularity of a mes-
sage can increase its persuasiveness); see also Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transpar-
ency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983, 1010 (2004) (“The phe-
nomenon of popular influence is well-established in the social science literature, 
which shows that ideas perceived to have achieved broad acceptance are generally 
more persuasive.”). 
 120 See Corbin, supra note 55, at 1295. Professor Caroline Corbin of the Uni-
versity of Miami School of Law stated the following on this issue: “[O]ur minds 
have developed a . . . faster, easier method to help process information. This cog-
nitive process relies on heuristics—rules of thumb—and ‘more accessible infor-
mation such as the source’s identity or other non-content cues.’ Heuristics . . . can 
lead to errors in some predictable ways . . . . [R]esearch shows that . . . our decision 
making is riddled with cognitive shortcuts that regularly distort how we gather 
and process information. Just as compelled speech that attempts to exploit factual 
errors is distorting, compelled speech that intentionally exploits predictable cog-
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B. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
Subsequent to Central Hudson, in which the Supreme Court set 
out the intermediate scrutiny standard for commercial speech,121 
Zauderer was decided.122 
1. THE CASE 
In 1982, attorney Zauderer took out advertisements in thirty-six 
Ohio newspapers announcing that his firm represented women on a 
contingent-fee basis in cases related to injuries caused by the Dalkon 
Shield Intrauterine Device (IUD).123 The advertisements provided a 
telephone number that individuals could call for “free infor-
mation.”124 Zauderer acquired clients as a result of the ads.125 
The Supreme Court took issue with the advertisement, which in-
formed the public that “if there is no recovery, no legal fees are owed 
by our clients.”126 The Court noted that the advertisement did not 
distinguish “legal fees” from “costs” for the “layman not aware of 
the meaning of these terms of art” and that the advertisement sug-
gested a “no-lose proposition” in that Zauderer’s representation 
would “come entirely free of charge.”127 The Court found the likeli-
hood that potential clients would be misled was “hardly a specula-
tive one: it is commonplace that members of the public are often 
unaware of the technical meanings of such terms as ‘fees’ and 
‘costs’—terms that, in ordinary usage, might well be virtually inter-
changeable.”128 When the possibility of deception is as self-evident 
as it was in this case, the Court held that it would “not require the 
State to ‘conduct a survey of the . . . public before it [may] determine 
                                                                                                             
nitive errors can be considered distortion of the discourse. Speaker confusion in-
vites exploitation of another common heuristic: the ‘defer-to-trusted-expert’ heu-
ristic. By compelling an authority figure to speak its message, the government can 
‘add a patina of trustworthiness and expertise to its message.’” Id. at 1295–97. 
 121 See generally Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of 
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 122 See generally Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 
(1985). 
 123 Id. at 630–31. 
 124 Id. at 631. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 652. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
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that the [advertisement] had a tendency to mislead.’”129 The Court 
found that a speech compulsion clarifying that clients will have to 
pay costs even if their lawsuits are unsuccessful was proper.130 In 
finding so, the Court noted that the attorney’s interest in not provid-
ing such purely factual and uncontroversial information was “mini-
mal” and that the compulsion need be judged only by an easy-to-
satisfy rational basis test.131 That test was satisfied here, the Court 
held, because the disclosure requirement was “reasonably related to 
the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”132 
2. CIRCUIT SPLITS ON ZAUDERER’S APPLICATION 
a. Split in the Requirement of “Curing Consumer Deception” 
This circuit split concerns whether compelled commercial 
speech disclosures should be subjected to a rational basis analysis 
only when the government is compelling “factual and uncontrover-
sial” information to prevent “deception of consumers” or also when 
the government is compelling “factual and uncontroversial” infor-
mation with other policy objectives in mind. Thus, the overarching 
question is whether the government must meet a more rigorous 
standard when the government is not seeking to prevent decep-
tion.133 The circuits have split and follow one of two rules stated 
below.134 
Some circuits—the Second,135 D.C.,136 the Ninth,137 and the 
Tenth138—have found that the government can compel any “factual 
and uncontroversial” disclosure on an ad, label, or other commercial 
                                                                                                             
 129 Id. at 652–53 (quoting FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391–
92 (1965)). 
 130 Id. at 653. 
 131 Id. at 651–53. 
 132 Id. at 651 (emphasis added). 
 133 See Note, Repackaging Zauderer, 130 HARV. L. REV. 972, 972–73 (2017). 
 134 See id. 
 135 See Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 113–14 (2d. Cir. 
2001). 
 136 See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 
2014). 
 137 See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 871 F.3d 884, 891–92 (9th 
Cir. 2017). 
 138 See United States v. Wenger, 427 F.3d 840, 844, 849–50 (10th Cir. 2005). 
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speech.139 These circuits have held that Zauderer applies because 
the rules at issue only require the disclosure of “factual and uncon-
troversial information” that is rationally related to a state’s legiti-
mate interest.140 This is a broad reading of Zauderer. As Judge Ste-
phen Williams explained in AMI, “Zauderer is best read as applying 
not only to mandates aimed at curing deception but also to ones for 
other purposes.”141 Although this conclusion is arguably consistent 
with the conclusions reached by other circuits, it represents a mis-
reading of Zauderer and effectively eliminates meaningful constitu-
tional protection for compelled commercial speech.142 
                                                                                                             
 139 See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 871 F.3d 884, 891–92 (9th 
Cir. 2017) (holding that Zauderer’s “framework applies when a state requires dis-
closures for a different state interest, such as to promote public health” by requir-
ing warnings about health effects of certain sugar-sweetened beverages); Am. 
Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 27 (holding that compelling “country of origin labeling,” 
while not necessary to cure deception, is subject to rational basis scrutiny); Safe-
lite Grp., Inc. v. Jepsen, 764 F.3d 258, 263–66 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that a re-
quirement that a corporation disclose the name of a competitor’s repair shop to 
customers fell outside Zauderer’s “factual and uncontroversial” bounds); Disc. 
Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 554–55 (6th Cir. 
2012) (noting that Zauderer allows mandated disclosures that serve “some sub-
stantial interest.”); N.Y. State Rest. V. N.Y. City Bd., 556 F.3d 114, 117–18 132 
(2d Cir. 2009) (upholding a New York City regulation that required certain res-
taurants to post calorie content information on menus and menu boards that were 
not previously deceptive under rational basis review); United States v. Wenger, 
427 F.3d 840, 844, 849–50 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that despite being upheld as 
part of the federal government’s broad powers to regulate securities, section 
17(b)’s disclosure requirements would have been upheld as a regulation on com-
mercial speech; even when the government has not shown that absent the required 
disclosure the speech would be false or deceptive, and even when the disclosure 
requirement serves some substantial government interest other than preventing 
deception, such as fraud prevention). 
 140 See, e.g., Nat’l Elec. Mfrs Ass’n, 272 F.3d at 113–15 (holding that statute 
imposing labeling requirements upon mercury-containing lamps as to their con-
tent and proper method of disposal did not violate manufacturers’ free speech 
rights, as required disclosure of such factual commercial information was ration-
ally related to state’s legitimate goals of protecting human health and environment 
and increasing consumer awareness of mercury presence in certain products); Am. 
Beverage Ass’n, 871 F.3d at 891–92. 
 141 Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 36 (Henderson, J., dissenting) (quoting Am. 
Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 746 F.3d 1065, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). 
 142 See Note, supra note 133, at 973–75. 
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Other circuits have found that the proper rule is that the govern-
ment can only compel a “factual and uncontroversial” disclosure on 
an ad, label, or other form of commercial speech if it is curing an 
otherwise deceptive ad, label, or other form of commercial 
speech.143 This is a narrow reading of Zauderer. As explained be-
low, the argument here is that there is no conflict between Central 
Hudson and Zauderer, so the two are best understood as two aspects 
of the same underlying doctrine and not as alternatives.144 The 
courts do not have to choose between them.145 
b. Split in the Requirement of “Factual and Uncontroversial” 
The federal courts of appeal have also been inconsistent in de-
termining what kinds of disclosures are “purely factual and uncon-
troversial,” in the words of the Zauderer opinion. 146  For that reason, 
                                                                                                             
 143 See e.g., Ocheesee Creamery, LLC v. Putnam, 851 F.3d 1228, 1235–36 
(11th Cir. 2017) (noting that a speech restriction that neither concerns unlawful 
activity nor is inherently misleading may only be regulated if it satisfies interme-
diate scrutiny); Dwyer v. Cappell, 762 F.3d 275, 281–83 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding 
that a guideline could not compel commercial speech on legal advertisements 
when the guideline did not require disclosing anything that could reasonably rem-
edy consumer deception); Greater Balt. Ctr. For Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. 
Mayor of Balt., 721 F.3d 264, 283 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that “[d]isclosure re-
quirements aimed at misleading commercial speech need only survive rational 
basis scrutiny, by being ‘reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing 
deception of consumers.’”) (citations omitted); Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. La. Att’y Dis-
ciplinary Bd., 632 F.3d 212, 218 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that a regulation that 
imposes a disclosure obligation on a potentially misleading legal advertisement 
will survive First Amendment review if the required disclosure (1) passes inter-
mediate scrutiny or (2), if the ad is related to preventing consumer deception, and 
it passes rational basis); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 
U.S. 229, 248–52 (2010) (holding that a requirement that professionals assisting 
consumers with bankruptcy must state that they are a debt relief agency in their 
ads is constitutional because the speech in question was directed at misleading 
commercial speech); Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 310 (1st 
Cir. 2005) (upholding, under rational basis review, mandated disclosures by phar-
macy benefit managers (PBM) of economically significant information designed 
to protect covered entities from questionable PBM business practices); Cent. Ill. 
Light Co. v. Citizens Util. Bd., 827 F.2d 1169, 1173 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that 
a mandatory commercial disclosure was unconstitutional when it was not justified 
by consumer deception, but by a legitimate state police power interest). 
 144 Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 76, at 436. 
 145 See id. 
 146 See infra pp. 32–36. 
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the next part of this Comment will advocate for a narrow reading of 
Zauderer, in which the “factual and uncontroversial” analysis is 
done only after a finding that the compelled commercial speech 
cures deception. 
III. FOR NARROW ZAUDERER 
“Zauderer, properly understood, fits comfortably within the 
Central Hudson framework.”147 The First Amendment provides 
equivalent protection for both the right to speak and the right not to 
speak, and there is no reason to assume that mandatory disclosures 
get a pass in the commercial context.148 Under Central Hudson, 
commercial speech is only eligible for heightened protection if the 
speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading.149 Zauderer’s 
holding that mandatory disclosures will be readily upheld so long as 
they are reasonably related to the state’s interest in preventing de-
ception of consumers was not novel—it was a straightforward ap-
plication of Central Hudson.150 Accordingly, commercial speech is 
not protected if it is deceptive, and compelled commercial speech is 
not curtailed if it prevents deception. 
A. The Test 
This Comment argues that the proper application of Zauderer 
rational basis is a two-step inquiry. First, the court must ask if the 
commercial speech is deceptive or misleading. If the commercial 
speech is not deceptive or misleading, intermediate scrutiny should 
be applied. If the commercial speech is deceptive or misleading, the 
court must ask if the compelled commercial speech is “factual and 
                                                                                                             
 147 Jonathan H. Adler, What are the Constitutional Limits on Compelled Com-
mercial Speech?, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (April 7, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/04/07/what-
are-the-constitutional-limits-on-compelled-commercial-
speech/?utm_term=.7c84521a6ca2 [hereinafter Constitutional Limits]. 
 148 See id.; Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 21, at 432. 
 149 447 U.S. 557, 557 (1980). 
 150 Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 21, at 435. 
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uncontroversial” speech intended to cure the deception. If so, ra-
tional basis should apply.151 Otherwise, intermediate scrutiny should 
apply. 
B. Unworkable 
As stated above, in theory, compelled disclosures are a good 
idea.152 Factual disclosure laws, which inject more information into 
the marketplace of ideas, further First Amendment goals.153 “In fact, 
‘it is often the very purpose of compelled speech requirements to 
correct market flaws in the marketplace of ideas and further the First 
Amendment’s goal of maximizing communication and discovery of 
truth.’”154 Nonetheless, broad Zauderer has subjected too many 
mandated disclosures to rational basis review and eliminated mean-
ingful protection for commercial speech. 
This Comment advocates for the application of narrow Zauderer 
because passing mandated commercial speech disclosures pursuant 
to any legitimate state interest on the basis that the compelled speech 
is “factual and uncontroversial” is unworkable in that it leads to in-
consistent court rulings. For that reason, the solution is to not begin 
the inquiry with “factual and uncontroversial.” Instead, the “factual 
and uncontroversial” requirement should be considered in the con-
text of Zauderer’s full-holding. It should be linked to correcting de-
ception. In essence, this two-step inquiry requires deception in the 
commercial speech before asking if the compelled commercial 
                                                                                                             
 151 Surgeon General Warnings are required on tobacco products despite the 
fact that the products are not deceptive. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON 
GENERAL (May 27, 2004), available at https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statis-
tics/sgr/2004/complete_report/index.htm. This Note advocates for surgeon gen-
eral warnings on the basis of the history of deception with these advertisements. 
See Pub. Citizen v. La. Att’y Disciplinary, 632 F.3d 212, 218 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(“Advertising that ‘is inherently likely to deceive or where the record indicates 
that a particular form or method . . . of advertising has in fact been deceptive’ 
receives no protection and the State may prohibit it entirely.”) (citation omitted). 
 152 See supra pp. 22–23. 
 153 See Corbin, supra note 55, at 1302. 
 154 Jennifer M. Keighley, Can You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial 
Speech and the First Amendment, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 539, 551 (2012) (quoting 
David W. Ogden, Is There a First Amendment “Right to Remain Silent”?: The 
Supreme Court’s “Compelled Speech” Doctrine, 40 FED. B. NEWS & J. 368, 370 
(1993)). 
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speech is “factual and uncontroversial.” This should alleviate some 
of the consequences of applying the unworkable “factual and uncon-
troversial” test. 
1. DEFINING A WORKABLE STANDARD 
A workable test or standard “allows one to distinguish the rele-
vant limitations from the irrelevant [limitations].”155 It is a test that 
clearly distinguishes between two possibilities and clarifies where 
theory and practice meet.156 A test or standard is unworkable when 
it is too hard to actually apply, and if, from the viewpoint of judicial 
discretion, it is subjective.157 
2. UNWORKABLE BROAD ZAUDERER 
The broad Zauderer test is unworkable as evidenced by incon-
sistent appellate court rulings.158 
                                                                                                             
 155 Mattias Derlén & Johan Lindholm, Article 28 E.C. and Rules on Use: A 
Step Towards a Workable Doctrine on Measures Having Equivalent Effect to 
Quantitative Restrictions, 16 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 191, 200 (2010). 
 156 See id. at 224; see also Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of 
the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 917 (1963) (noting that “rules must be 
workable in terms of the realities of maintaining a system in the everyday world” 
and that “judicial administration . . . is a critical factor.”); Jacy T. Jasmer, ETW 
Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.: A Workable Standard, an Unworkable Decision, 
5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 293, 313–14 (2004) (noting that “[d]espite the criti-
cism of the ‘transformative elements’ test established in Comedy III, the test is 
essentially workable for three reasons: (1) it strikes the correct balance between 
the right of publicity and First Amendment rights; (2) it allows courts to make 
necessary fact specific determinations; and (3) other alternative approaches do not 
offer any improvements; on the contrary, they may be even more faulty.”). 
 157 See Jasmer, supra note 156, at 313–14; see also Emily Michele Papp, Note, 
Just Take My Word for It: Creating a Workable Test to Ensure Reliability in Over-
seas Document Verification Reports for Asylum Proceedings, 101 IOWA L. REV. 
2141, 2165–66 (2016); see e.g., Lin v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 459 F.3d 255, 258–
59, 270 (2d Cir. 2006) (distinguishing between a workable and unworkable test 
used to determine the authenticity of documentary evidence submitted to support 
an application for asylum by holding that one test was unworkable because it was 
not succinct and made compliance overly burdensome). 
 158 See Persistent Threats, supra note 44, at 314. 
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a. Defining “Factual and Uncontroversial” 
“Factual and uncontroversial” is a term of art that is not readily 
understood. Consequently, courts rule inconsistently because it is 
unclear what makes a mandated disclosure “factual and uncontro-
versial.”159 The difficulty in classifying “factual and uncontrover-
sial” is exemplified in the subsequent court rulings. 
In 2012, the D.C. Circuit in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food 
& Drug Admin., was asked to determine whether the Food and Drug 
Administration’s rule requiring display of new textual and graphic 
images on cigarette packaging was unconstitutional.160 While ac-
knowledging that none of the images were “patently false,” the court 
wrote that the images were “not ‘purely’ factual because . . . they 
are primarily intended to evoke an emotional response.”161 The court 
linked “factual and uncontroversial” communications with “pure at-
tempts to convey information.”162 As noted by compelled commer-
                                                                                                             
 159 See Timothy J. Straub, Comment, Fair Warning?: The First Amendment, 
Compelled Commercial Disclosures, and Cigarette Warning Labels, 40 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1201, 1252–53, 1252 n.381 (2013); see also Am. Beverage 
Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 871 F.3d 884, 893 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that factual 
accuracy is, at a minimum, controversial when a warning provides an unqualified 
statement); CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 854 F.3d 1105, 1117 
(9th Cir. 2017) (“Given that the purpose of the compelled disclosure is to provide 
accurate factual information to the consumer, we agree that any compelled dis-
closure must be ‘purely factual.’ However, ‘uncontroversial’ in this context refers 
to the factual accuracy of the compelled disclosure, not to its subjective impact on 
the audience.”); Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(looking to the dictionary for the definition of “controversial”); Safelite Grp., Inc. 
v. Jepsen, 764 F.3d 258, 263 (2d Cir. 2014) (“On a cursory review, our precedent 
arguably supports the district court’s conclusion that this law simply requires dis-
closure of accurate, factual information.”); Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 
760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (stating that a required disclosure “could be so 
one-sided or incomplete that [it] would not qualify as ‘factual and uncontrover-
sial’” under Zauderer); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1216 
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that a disclosure was not purely factual because it “in-
tended to evoke an emotional response.”) overruled by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 160 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1208. 
 161 Id. at 1216–17. 
 162 Id. 
2018] COMPELLED COMMERCIAL DISCLOSURES 1225 
 
cial speech scholars, “what are ‘pure attempts to convey infor-
mation’?”163 “[T]he opinion suggests that the D.C. Circuit would re-
quire the government to limit compelled disclosures to ‘just the 
facts,’ presented in black and white, if [rational basis review] is to 
apply.”164 
Subsequently, in American Meat Institute v. Dept. of Agricul-
ture,165 the D.C. circuit revisited and overturned R.J Reynolds, now 
defining “factual” and “uncontroversial” as a two-step independent 
inquiry.166 “Controversial” was interpreted as something that “com-
municates a message that is controversial for some reason other than 
dispute about simple factual accuracy.”167 The concurrence in Amer-
ican Meat Institute v. Dept. of Agriculture noted that it is unclear 
how judges should assess and determine if a disclosure is “contro-
versial.”168 
Courts have continued to define “factual and uncontroversial” 
differently. A year after American Meat Institute, in National Asso-
ciation of Manufacturers, the D.C. Circuit once again detailed the 
lack of clarity in defining this standard and stated that “uncontrover-
sial” must mean something different than “purely factual.”169 It 
looked to the dictionary definition of “controversy” to find that it “is 
a dispute, especially a public one.”170 The Sixth Circuit, by contrast, 
held that the “purely factual and uncontroversial” phrase from Zau-
derer was merely descriptive and not a legal standard.171 That court 
                                                                                                             
 163 Micah L. Berman, Clarifying Standards for Compelled Commercial 
Speech, 50 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 53, 62 (2016). “The phrase presumably refers 
to one (or both) of the following distinctions: (1) text-only, factual disclosures are 
‘pure’, while pictorial images are, at least potentially, ‘inflammatory’ and there-
fore non-factual; and/or (2) the straightforward, nonjudgmental conveyance of 
factual information is ‘pure,’ while efforts to influence consumer behavior are 
not.” Id. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 23, 27 (D.C. Cir. 
2014). 
 166 Id.; see also Berman, supra note 163, at 70. 
 167 Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 27. 
 168 Id. at 34 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
 169 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 528–29 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 170 Id. at 529. 
 171 Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 554–55 
(6th Cir. 2012). 
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held that textual warnings requiring disclosure of factual infor-
mation rather than opinions is subject to rational basis scrutiny.172 
Most recently, the Ninth Circuit has stated, “[g]enerally, a disclosure 
requirement is purely factual and uncontroversial under Zauderer so 
long as it ‘provide[s] accurate factual information to the con-
sumer.’”173 
A few courts, including the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in R.J 
Reynolds, have insinuated that “disclosures that ‘persuade’ are less 
factual that [sic] those that merely ‘inform.’”174 But how does one 
tell the difference? The issue here is that seemingly every informa-
tive or factual disclosure also aims to persuade.175 For example, a 
disclosure requirement that states, “Smoking [c]auses Lung Cancer, 
Heart Disease, Emphysema, [a]nd May Complicate Pregnancy” is 
both factual and persuasive.176 Therefore, it may be unworkable to 
distinguish fact from opinion.177 Further, if courts were to deem un-
enforceable disclosures that are an expression of opinion or that 
evoke an emotional response, instead of fact, “[o]pponents of man-
dated warnings will nearly always be able to point to some scientific 
studies questioning the government’s position.”178 
b. Consequences of an Unenforceable Test 
When applying an unworkable standard, court holdings seem 
nonsensical. For example, in 2017, the Ninth Circuit decided two 
cases applying the same “factual and uncontroversial” test in both: 
“[g]enerally, a disclosure requirement is purely factual and uncon-
troversial under Zauderer so long as it ‘provide[s] accurate factual 
                                                                                                             
 172 Id. at 561–62. 
 173 Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 871 F.3d 884, 893 (9th Cir. 
2017) (quoting CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 854 F.3d 1105, 
1118 (9th Cir. 2017)). 
 174 Berman, supra note 163, at 67. 
 175 See id. at 67–68; Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 76, at 
907 (“The boundary between fact and opinion is an intrinsically troubled area.”). 
 176 Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98–474, § 4(a)(1), 98 
Stat. 2200, 2201 (1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333). This Note 
advocates for surgeon general warnings. See supra note 151. 
 177 Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 76, at 907–08. 
 178 Berman, supra note 163, at 72. 
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information to the consumer.’”179  Nonetheless, the holdings are dif-
ficult to reconcile. 
In CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, the Ninth Cir-
cuit upheld the city of Berkeley’s requirement that cell-phone retail-
ers warn customers about possible safety risks of carrying a cell 
phone too close to one’s body and thereby exposing oneself to ex-
cessive levels of “RF radiation.”180  The court upheld the compelled 
disclosure pursuant to the federal government’s interest in “protect-
ing [consumer] health and safety.”181 The court found that this dis-
closure requirement was “reasonably related to [protection of the 
health and safety of consumers]” despite conceding that the FCC 
“lack[ed] . . . proof of dangerousness . . . .”182 To justify this deci-
sion, the court noted that the compelled disclosure was “purely fac-
tual” because each sentence was “literally true.”183 This holding 
contradicted a similar case decided by the Ninth Circuit a few years 
earlier.184 
Subsequent to CTIA-Wireless, in American Beverage Associa-
tion, the court struck down San Francisco’s requirement that adver-
tisements for sugar-sweetened beverages within San Francisco in-
clude the following statement: “WARNING: Drinking beverages 
with added sugar(s) contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth de-
cay.”185 The court seemed to distinguish this case from CTIA-
Wireless because this case involved a “literally true but misleading 
disclosure [that] creates the possibility of consumer deception.”186 
In this case, as in CTIA-Wireless, the court upheld the “protect[ion] 
                                                                                                             
 179 Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 871 F.3d 884, 893 (quoting 
CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 854 F.3d 1105, 1118 (9th Cir. 
2017)). 
 180 CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n, 854 F.3d at 1111–12. 
 181 Id. at 1118–19. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 See Berman, supra note 163, at 70–72 (noting that in 2012 the Ninth circuit 
decided a case that involved a mandated disclaimer similar to the one in CTIA-
Wireless. In that case, the court stated that because “‘[t]here is a debate in the 
scientific community about the health effects of cell phones,’ this was an expres-
sion of [] ‘opinion,’ rather than an expression of fact.”). 
 185 Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 871 F.3d 884, 888, 897–98 
(9th Cir. 2017). 
 186 Id. at 893. 
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of [consumer] health and safety” as a valid government interest .”187 
In deciding whether the mandated disclosure was “purely factual 
and uncontroversial,” the court noted that 
[t]he warning provides the unqualified statement that 
“[d]rinking beverages with added sugar(s) contrib-
utes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay,” S.F. 
Health Code § 4203(a), and therefore conveys the 
message that sugar-sweetened beverages contribute 
to these health conditions regardless of the quantity 
consumed or other lifestyle choices. This is contrary 
to statements by the FDA that added sugars are “gen-
erally recognized as safe.”188 
In this case, the court found the language of the disclosure was 
misleading in that it did not qualify that “overconsumption of sugar-
sweetened beverages contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth de-
cay, or that consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages may contrib-
ute to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay.”189 Additionally, the court 
noted that the “message [was] deceptive in light of the current state 
of research on [the] issue.”190 
The differing outcomes in these cases are nonsensical. The state-
ment “drinking beverages with added sugar(s) contributes to obe-
sity, diabetes, and tooth decay” is no more misleading than the state-
ment on radiation exposure’s dangerousness.191 Both statements, as 
admitted by the Ninth Circuit of Appeals, are scientifically unproven 
                                                                                                             
 187 Id. at 894. 
 188 Id. at 895. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. 
 191 See id; CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 854 F.3d 1105, 
1118–19 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[T]here was nothing before the district court showing 
that such radiation had been proven dangerous. But this is beside the point. The 
fact that RF radiation from cell phones had not been proven dangerous was well 
known to the FCC in 1996 when it adopted SAR limits to RF radiation; was well 
known in 2013 when it refused to exclude cell phones from its rule adopting SAR 
limits; and was well known in 2015 when it required cell phone manufacturers to 
tell consumers how to avoid exceeding SAR limits. After extensive consultation 
with federal agencies with expertise about the health effects of radio-frequency 
radiation, the FCC decided, despite the lack of proof of dangerousness, that the 
best policy was to adopt SAR limits with a large margin of safety.”). 
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or unqualified.192 The only notable distinction between the disclo-
sure mandated in CTIA-Wireless and American Beverage Company 
is that the former used qualifying language, such as “may exceed the 
federal guidelines for exposure to RF radiation,” and the latter failed 
to use qualifying language.193 
In these cases, the Ninth Circuit has articulated yet another 
seemingly arbitrary guideline for “factual and uncontroversial”—
one that hinges on whether the language is “literally true,” yet ad-
mittedly, unproven or unqualified. The problem here is not that the 
Supreme Court has failed to give guidance on what is “factual and 
uncontroversial,” but that it is almost impossible to formulate a 
workable guideline. 
This could not have been what the Zauderer Court had in mind 
when it held that a “purely factual and uncontroversial” disclosure 
that is not unduly burdensome will withstand First Amendment 
scrutiny so long as it is reasonably related to curing deception of 
consumers.194 First, the Ninth Circuit makes its decision pursuant to 
the government’s interest in protecting consumer health and 
safety.195 Second, the Ninth Circuit, in conceding that the health 
warnings mentioned in the mandated disclosures were not scientifi-
cally qualified, fails to delineate a link between the mandated dis-
closure and the government’s interest in protecting consumer health 
and safety.196 Allowing mandated disclosures that satisfy an arbi-
                                                                                                             
 192 Id. 
 193 Am. Beverage Ass’n, 871 F.3d at 895–96. 
 194 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
 195 Am. Beverage Ass’n, 871 F.3d at 894; CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n, 854 F.3d 
at 1119. 
 196 CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n, 854 F.3d at 1118–19 (“[T]here was nothing be-
fore the district court showing that such radiation had been proven dangerous. But 
this is beside the point. The fact that RF radiation from cell phones had not been 
proven dangerous was well known to the FCC in 1996 when it adopted SAR limits 
to RF radiation; was well known in 2013 when it refused to exclude cell phones 
from its rule adopting SAR limits; and was well known in 2015 when it required 
cell phone manufacturers to tell consumers how to avoid exceeding SAR limits. 
After extensive consultation with federal agencies with expertise about the health 
effects of radio-frequency radiation, the FCC decided, despite the lack of proof of 
dangerousness, that the best policy was to adopt SAR limits with a large margin 
of safety.”); see also Am. Beverage Ass’n, 871 F.3d at 895 (“Although San Fran-
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trary “factual and uncontroversial” threshold will effectively elimi-
nate any meaningful First Amendment protection for commercial 
speech. 
This Comment argues that “factual and uncontroversial” is an 
unworkable standard and therefore advocates for a rational basis 
level of review only when the “factual and uncontroversial” man-
dated disclosure cures a finding of consumer deception. 
C. Undermine the Government Goal of Helping Consumers 
By contrast, the broad “factual and uncontroversial” standard is 
so malleable that it might make it too easy to uphold disclosures that 
are inefficient. Governments, with increasing frequency, have been 
applying rational basis, under the unworkable standard of “factual 
and uncontroversial,” and requiring sellers to convey information 
that cannot plausibly be deemed the sort of truthful, uncontroversial 
information that consumers expect to see on product labeling. This 
Comment advocates for the narrow application of Zauderer because 
mandating commercial speech disclosures pursuant to any legiti-
mate state interest on the basis that the disclosures are “factual and 
uncontroversial” undermines the government’s goal of helping con-
sumers. The cacophony of speech will (1) drown out the important 
speech197 and (2) make it too easy for the government to mandate 
ideological speech.198 
1. DROWNING OUT IMPORTANT SPEECH 
Applying rational basis review to mandate commercial speech 
disclosures that serve any legitimate state interest on the basis that 
the disclosures are “factual and uncontroversial” will allow all man-
dated disclosures to survive free speech scrutiny since the consumer 
                                                                                                             
cisco’s experts state that ‘there is a clear scientific consensus’ that sugar-sweet-
ened beverages contribute to obesity and diabetes through “excessive caloric in-
take” and ‘by adding extra calories to the diet,’ the experts do not directly chal-
lenge the conclusion of the Associations’ expert that ‘when consumed as part of 
a diet that balances caloric intake with energy output, consuming beverages with 
added sugar does not contribute to obesity or diabetes.’”); Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n 
v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that where there is no scientific 
evidence, a disclosure requirement can’t be justified on the basis of “real harms.”); 
Berman, supra note 163, at 70–72. 
 197 See supra pp. 27–35. 
 198 Id. 
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“right to know” justification is legitimate.199 This is problematic be-
cause allowing all mandated disclosures will lead to the loss or 
drowning out of the important information. 200 
Disclosure requirements have prompted legal challenges when 
justified by an alleged consumer “right to know.”201 “[G]overn-
ments have imposed . . . disclosure requirements extending beyond 
product characteristics to” product history, production processes, 
and information about the product or service provider.202 For exam-
ple, in International Dairy Foods Association v. Amestoy, the Sec-
ond Circuit struck down Vermont’s mandatory labeling require-
ments for milk from cows that were administered rBST.203 The FDA 
had found that milk produced from cows treated with rBST was in-
distinguishable from milk from untreated cows, and no less safe.204 
In fact, “the FDA declared that any suggestion that there is a mean-
ingful difference would be ‘false and misleading.’”205 
                                                                                                             
 199 Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 21 at 458. The con-
sumer right to know is the “right to know information that could influence con-
sumer decisions.” Id. at 442. 
 200 Persistent Threats, supra note 44, at 311–312 (“[M]andating excessive in-
formation disclosure may actually result in the communication of less substantive 
content to consumers and reduced consumer understanding.”); see also Svetlana 
E. Bialkova et al., Standing Out in the Crowd: The Effect of Information Clutter 
on Consumer Attention for Front-of Pack Nutrition Labels, 41 FOOD POL’Y 65, 
69 tbl. 2 (2013) (recognizing that increases in information can reduce consumer 
attention and discernment); Elise Golan et al., Economics of Food Labeling, 24 J. 
CONSUMER POL’Y 117, 139 (2001) (noting that increased disclosure requirements 
can result in less consumer understanding); Mario F. Teisl & Brian Roe, The Eco-
nomics of Labeling: An Overview of Issues for Health and Environmental Disclo-
sure, 27 AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. REV. 141, 148 (1998) (“[S]imply increasing 
the amount of information on a label may actually make any given amount of 
information harder to extract.”). 
 201 Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 21 at 442–44, 458. 
 202 Id. at 424.  
 203 See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 204 See id. at 70, 75–76, 80; see also Bovine Somatotropin (BST), U.S. FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/SafetyHealth/Prod-
uctSafetyInformation/ucm055435.htm (last updated Oct. 19, 2016, 1:22 PM). 
 205 See Persistent Threats, supra note 44, at 304 (quoting Interim Guidance on 
the Voluntary Labeling of Milk and Milk Products from Cows that Have Not Been 
Treated with Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin, 59 Fed. Reg. 6279-04, 6279-80 
(Feb. 10, 1994)). 
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Consumers may or may not prefer milk from cows 
that were administered rBST, and producers should 
be free to use their labels to identify their products as 
potentially desirable to consumers with particular 
preferences, but should not be forced to do so . . . . 
The government’s role is to ensure that whatever in-
formation is disclosed is truthful and not misleading, 
not to mandate disclosure of product characteristics 
important to some consumers but not others.206 
Allowing all mandated disclosures cuts against First Amend-
ment values and undermines the robust protection of commercial 
speech more generally because it can lead to these inaccuracies, 
overstatements, and misleading disclosures.207 “When the govern-
ment requires a seller or producer to disclose specific information 
about a product or service, the requirement itself communicates a 
message.”208 It communicates that this is a factor consumers should 
consider,209 “and may even suggest to some consumers that there is 
something ‘wrong’ or unsafe about products bearing such a la-
bel.”210 Accordingly, allowing the cellphone disclosure requirement 
in CTIA-Wireless may be counterproductive because it can mislead 
a consumer into thinking radiation from cellphones is dangerous 
when no scientific data indicates that is the case. Similarly, the rBST 
disclosure communicates that rBST is a factor consumers should 
consider despite the fact that milk produced from cows treated with 
rBST was indistinguishable from milk from untreated cows. 
“[T]he consumer right to know is a rationale without discernible 
limits. If such an interest is a substantial interest then there is, quite 
literally, no end to the disclosures that can be mandated,” as rational 
basis review will be easy to meet. 211 A dynamic market discovery 
process, with only limited and targeted government interventions, is 
a more effective way to serve the consumer interest in obtaining 
more complete information about goods and services.212 
                                                                                                             
 206 See Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 21, at 472–73. 
 207 See Corbin supra note 55, at 1292–95, 1300–04. 
 208 Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 21, at 447. 
 209 See id. 
 210 Id. at 449. 
 211 Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 21, at 444. 
 212 Id. at 426. 
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“The question . . . should not be whether the [government] gets 
to avail itself of an easier constitutional test but whether the govern-
ment has any interests that are substantial enough to justify this com-
pelled speech requirement . . . .”213 These interests would have to go 
beyond simply satisfying consumer curiosity or “right to know.”214 
2. OPEN TO ABUSE AND IMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT 
IDEOLOGY 
Allowing all mandated disclosures to survive free speech scru-
tiny under the consumer “right to know” justification is problematic 
because the cacophony of speech will undermine the government’s 
goal of efficiently informing consumers. Among the confusing or 
counterproductive information that may be compelled when passing 
mandated commercial speech disclosures pursuant to any legitimate 
state interest on the basis that the compelled speech is “factual and 
uncontroversial” is the government’s ideology.215 This happens be-
cause allowing a rational basis standard of review for any disclosure 
that can qualify as “factual and uncontroversial,” where rational ba-
sis is easy to pass given the consumer “right to know” justification, 
makes it too easy to uphold disclosures that are actually ideological. 
The “factual and uncontroversial” broad approach does “not provide 
. . . a principled way to discern, in any given case, whether a regula-
tion mandates providing additional factual information (relatively 
innocuous) or compels espousing beliefs and ideology (perni-
cious).”216 At least with the narrow approach, the compelled disclo-
sure must be attempting to cure deception, which makes it less likely 
to be motivated by ideology. 
a. Harm to Speaker 
Compelling a commercial speaker to articulate the government’s 
ideological message is anathema in free speech because it can effec-
tively force producers and sellers to stigmatize their own products, 
                                                                                                             
 213 Constitutional Limits, supra note 147. 
 214 Id. 
 215 See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 871 F.3d 884, 894 (9th 
Cir. 2017). 
 216 Royal, supra note 33, at 207. 
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production methods, and beliefs by giving voice to a politically de-
termined set of values.217 
1. FORCED TO CRITICIZE OWN PRODUCTS OR PRODUCTION 
METHODS 
These disclosures effectively force a producer or seller to stig-
matize their own otherwise legal products and production methods 
by forcing the speaker to testify against its own product and implic-
itly endorse the notion that the disclosure of a given fact should be 
relevant to a consumer’s decision about whether to purchase the 
product.218 “Such requirements may be used to pursue ideological 
agendas or to place burdens upon competitors.”219 RBST labeling 
illustrates this point. 
As stated above, when producers adorn their product with an 
“rBST free” label, they are communicating to consumers that this is 
a product characteristic that they believe should influence consumer 
choices, even though the FDA maintains that rBST does not alter 
the content of the resulting food product.220 “The producer is re-
quired to give voice to the idea that a product that may contain 
[rBST] is meaningfully different—normatively if not physically—
than a product that does not, even if the producer does not agree with 
the message.”221 
2. ACTING AS A MOUTHPIECE FOR THE GOVERNMENT 
Mandating such disclosures can effectively force producers and 
sellers to give voice to a politically determined set of values that the 
speaker may not agree with.222 The government-compelled message 
may be misattributed to the speaker.223 This amplifies messages of 
government preferences over the speaker’s preferences, which 
                                                                                                             
 217 See Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 21, at 444. 
 218 See id. at 448–49. 
 219 Id. 
 220 Cf. id. at 447–48 (making the same observation in regard to GMO label-
ing). 
 221 Id at 448. 
 222 Id. at 444. 
 223 Laurent Sacharoff, Listener Interests in Compelled Speech Cases, 44 CAL. 
W.L. REV. 329, 384–86 (2008). 
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skews public opinion in the marketplace of ideas.224  The repetitive 
exposure to the message may lead to a soft form of mind control 
over listeners,225 which gives the government message a better 
chance of prevailing in the “marketplace of ideas” than the speaker’s 
message.226 
Consider Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, in which the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld South Dakota’s requirement that 
physicians provide their patients with a written statement informing 
women contemplating abortions that “the abortion will terminate the 
life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being.”227 The Ninth 
Circuit has expressed that this compelled commercial speech disclo-
sure is particularly concerning because it is highly politicized and 
represents the government’s policy views.228 In compelling the 
speech, the government adopts a specific viewpoint and forces the 
speaker to express it.229 As stated above, the speaker risks the addi-
tional harm of listeners attributing the compelled statement to the 
speaker. 
b. Harm to Listener 
Compelling a commercial speaker to bolster the government’s 
ideological beliefs is problematic because it can effectively distort 
the marketplace of ideas, thereby insulting the listener or consumer 
autonomy by allowing ideology to masquerade as fact. 
                                                                                                             
 224 See id; Corbin, supra note 55, at 1295, 1300–04. 
 225 See Sacharoff, supra note 223; Corbin, supra note 55, at 1307. 
 226 Corbin, supra note 55, at 1297 (“Speaker confusion invites exploitation of 
another common heuristic: the ‘defer-to-trusted-expert’ heuristic. By compelling 
an authority figure to speak its message, the government can ‘add a patina of trust-
worthiness and expertise to its message.’ Thus, the government can manipulate 
the discourse by, for example, forcing a scientist to claim that the evidence of 
global warming is inconclusive or compelling doctors to convey to patients the 
state’s ideological viewpoint about a contested moral issue, instead of making the 
same points through its own less trusted and less prestigious communications.”). 
 227 653 F.3d 662, 665 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 228 Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 871 F.3d 884, 894, 896 (9th 
Cir. 2017) (“A compelled disclosure that requires speakers ‘to use their own prop-
erty to convey an antagonistic ideological message,’ or ‘to respond to a hostile 
message when they would prefer to remain silent,’ or ‘to be publicly identified or 
associated with another’s message,’ cannot withstand First Amendment scru-
tiny.”). 
 229 Sacharoff, supra note 223, at 384–86. 
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1. DISTORTED MARKETPLACE AS AN INSULT TO AUTONOMY 
“Listeners are harmed by [misattribution of government speech 
to the commercial speaker] because it compromises two important 
methods listeners use to decide whether to be persuaded by a mes-
sage: the popularity of the message and the speaker’s level of au-
thority.”230 The repetitive exposure to the message may lead listen-
ers to adopt the government-mandated speech simply because it is 
more popular.231 Further, because this speech is linked to the 
speaker, who is the producer of the product and expected to have 
expertise or authority, the listeners will be more likely to adopt the 
speech.232 As previously stated, in allowing the government to dic-
tate the information injected into the “marketplace of ideas,” there 
will be distortion in what consumers should consider important.233 
2. IDEOLOGY MASQUERADING AS FACT AS AN INSULT TO 
AUTONOMY 
The relaxed “factual and uncontroversial” standard, coupled 
with the consumer “right to know,” allows the government to de-
ceive audiences by masquerading ideology as a fact. The govern-
ment may use its coercive power for illegitimately paternalistic ends 
in compelling protective speech that aims to persuade.234 
However, every state attempt to compel speech does not disre-
spect audience autonomy.235 “The government’s goal makes a dif-
ference. Most suspect is when the state urges a course of action that 
actually detracts from the audience’s autonomy. Urging people not 
to vote, for example, would seem to undermine rather than enhance 
people’s autonomy.”236 
Less obviously, decisional autonomy is disrespected by “gov-
ernment attempts to change the audience’s mind on a contested 
                                                                                                             
 230 Id. at 385. 
 231 See id. at 385–86. 
 232 See id. 
 233 See supra pp. 14–16. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. 
 236 Corbin, supra note 55, at 1303. 
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question.”237 The goal might be contested238 or the action endorsed 
to attain that goal might be contested.239 “However acceptable it 
might be for the government to urge a scientifically supported path 
(e.g., eat vegetables) to a universally recognized goal (e.g., good 
health), the government’s persuasion becomes problematic when it 
takes sides on a controversial issue (e.g., prayer) and presumes to 
know better than the individual what is best.”240 
Additionally, when the government uses fear appeals, it is more 
likely that the disclosure is ideological rather than an uncontrover-
sial disclosure of a fact.241 The literature evaluating the persuasive-
ness of different types of fear appeals demonstrates the complexity 
of the emotional and cognitive processing of these types of mes-
sages, and it illustrates that the key goal in implementing fear ap-
peals is to appeal to the audience’s emotions and not to inform.242 
The fear appeals means of compelling speech was utilized in 
Planned Parenthood. The mandated disclosure aimed to appeal to 
the fear and guilt of pregnant patients by warning them of the life-
ending consequences of abortion. Ideology is too easily masquer-
aded as fact and compelled by means of the relaxed “factual and 
uncontroversial” test and the consumer “right to know” justification. 
The listener is deceived and may make decisions based on a dis-
torted marketplace of ideas. 
                                                                                                             
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. (noting that “while it is hard to imagine that people would not support 
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health), there’s a difference between the government trying to persuade people to 
improve their health by eating vegetables (for which there is voluminous scientific 
support) and trying to persuade people to improve their health by fasting (for 
which there is not). Consequently, attempting to persuade you to eat more vege-
tables is not troublesome in the way a don’t-eat-at-all government campaign is.”). 
 240 Id. 
 241 See Caroline Mala Corbin, Emotional Compelled Disclosures, 127 HARV. 
L. REV. FORUM 357, 359–61 (2014). 
 242 See Glenn Leshner et al., Motivated Processing of Fear Appeal and Dis-
gust Images in Televised Anti-Tobacco Ads, 23 J. MEDIA PSYCHOL. 77, 77, 82 
(2011). 
1238 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1193 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Commercial speech is protected speech, and the First Amend-
ment protects against speech compulsions just as it protects against 
speech limitations. Compelled commercial speech has the ability to 
undermine free speech goals and values by distorting discourse, 
chilling speech, or intruding upon the autonomy of speakers or au-
diences. In order to avoid these issues, courts should subject com-
pelled commercial disclosures to rational basis scrutiny only when 
the compelled commercial speech is “factual and uncontroversial” 
speech aimed at curing deception because the alternative—applying 
rational basis when the compelled commercial disclosure is “factual 
and uncontroversial” speech aimed at any legitimate state interest—
is unworkable and leads to inconsistent court rulings. Moreover, ap-
plying rational basis to such large swaths of disclosures may lead to 
compelling too much information, the wrong kind of information or 
bolstering ideological beliefs because there will always be a legiti-
mate government interest to compel, i.e. the consumer “right to 
know.” This would ensure that only legitimate and beneficial dis-
closures are compelled, and that First Amendment protections are 
not abridged. 
 
